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The sharpest inequity within the climate change context is that those who are most 
vulnerable to and most seriously threatened by climate impacts are typically those 
who have contributed least to the problem.  Although this underlying characteristic of 
the climate problem is not always directly referred to, it is widely acknowledged and 
is at the heart of debates about historical responsibility. 
Historical responsibility has always been a difficult issue within climate negotiations, 
and is likely to remain contentious for two key reasons.  First, continued inadequacy 
of mitigation action is steadily increasing the potential for profound losses from 
climate impacts, predominantly experienced by those who have contributed little to 
the problem (as alluded to above) and who are already facing ongoing development 
challenges. Second, the urgency of global mitigation and shifting locus of the 
production of emissions has resulted in mounting pressure for mitigation action by 
countries with increasing emissions despite continued human development 
challenges. Despite some softening of the firewall between Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 
countries during the 2015 negotiations, tensions about the extent and implications of 
historical responsibility in the face of  increasing climate losses and mitigation 
pressure are likely to be central during the scheduled review of the workstream on 
loss and damage at COP22 in Marrakesh -- if not before.  
Several approaches to historical responsibility have emerged within the climate 
regime.  For example, one approach has been to explicitly include it in proposed 
allocations for emissions space – such as in the ‘Brazilian proposal’ 1 or in proposals 
for ‘Equitable Access to Sustainable Development’2.  The strength of these proposals 
is their clear articulation of the importance of historical responsibility to some 
countries, but they may feed political stalemates.  A second approach has avoided 
historical responsibility by stressing win-win opportunities within “green growth” 
strategies3.  The benefit of the green growth approaches is that they actively support 
constructive climate action. However, if they appear to be sweeping historical 
responsibility “under the carpet”, they could erode long-term solidarity and trust.  
Importantly, neither of these approaches have directly tackled the question of loss 
and damage despite increased understanding of the potential severity of climate 
impacts as documented in the fifth IPCC assessment.  
The crux of the tension is that a global agreement capable of achieving sustained, 
deep mitigation targets and an adequate response to climate impacts may have to 
integrate backwards-looking claims of historical responsibility, and forward-oriented 
                                               
1 Emilio LaRovere, Laura Valente de Macedo and Kevin Baumert, ‘The Brazilian Proposal on Relative 
Responsibility for Global Warming’, in Building on the Kyoto Protocol: Options for Protecting the Climate, 
ed. by K. A. Baumert and others (World Resources Institute, 2002), pp. 157–73. 
2  BASIC experts, (2011) Equitable Access to Sustainable Development: Contribution to the Body of 
Scientific Knowledge. 
3 Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, ‘Better Growth, Better Climate: The New Climate 
Economy Report’ (Global Commission on the Economy and Climate; C/O World Resources Institute, 
Washington D.C., 2014). 
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promotion of low-carbon development pathways. What would an approach to global 
climate policy capable of addressing the tension between these forces look like? 
Climate change is not the only time humans have been faced with historically 
rooted, collective action challenges involving justice disputes. Transitional justice is 
one set of tools that has been adapted to many specific conflicts at the interface of 
historical responsibility and imperatives for new collective futures.   However, lessons 
from these processes have not been examined for the climate context, although they 
could provide useful insights for developing acceptable approaches for reconciling 
past-oriented concerns about historical responsibility with future-oriented desires for 
broader and deeper collective action. This working paper is not proposing a full 
“transitional justice” process for climate policy: it is initiating a discussion about 
which, if any, particular strategies or tools developed within the transitional justice 
arena might be applicable to the climate problem. This first working paper is focused 
on the international level, but it is possible that transitional justice experiences may 
also be useful within domestic policy arenas when dealing with issues such as 
negative impacts of inappropriate mitigation action, or when trying to design policies 
that share compensation or benefits. 
2. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE CLIMATE CONTEXT 
‘Transitional justice’ refers to theory and practice aimed at enabling purposeful 
transitions from periods of deep injustices into more peaceful regimes.   A range of 
transitional justice processes emerged as many countries, often with recent colonial 
pasts, were faced with the challenge of re-building society after periods of violence, 
oppression and civil war.  The goal of these processes is to recognize and at least 
partially remedy past injustices while also building a sense of unity or solidarity. 
Such processes include a variety of practices and tools including trials, truth 
commissions, reparation, acknowledgement and pardon to name a few4 .  Originally 
focused on political rights, attention to social and economic rights has expanded5,6 
which has refocused attention from legal arrangements towards concrete opportunity 
shifts and investments to enable human flourishing.   
Transitional justice processes may seem like an unusual inspiration for climate 
change policy-making.  The limitations of this analogy are explored in section six. 
However, international climate policy dilemmas share four similarities with conflicts in 
which transitional justice processes have been useful. These elements include: 
a) unavoidable interdependence and potential costs of not finding an agreement 
for all Parties; 
                                               
4  Chandra Lekha Sriram, ‘Resolving Conflicts and Pursuing Accountability: Beyond ’Justice versus 
Peace’, in Palgrave Advances in Peacebuilding - Oliver P. Richmond, ed. by Oliver Richmond, 2010. 
5 Evelyne Schmid and Aoife Nolan, ‘“Do No Harm”? Exploring the Scope of Economic and Social Rights in 
Transitional Justice’, International Journal of Transitional Justice, 8.3 (2014), 362–82. 
6 e.g. Paul Gready and Simon Robins, ‘From Transitional to Transformative Justice: A New Agenda for 
Practice’, International Journal of Transitional Justice, 8.3 (2014), 339–61. 
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b) inadequacy of existing judicial processes for addressing the scope and type of 
injustices and harms involved; 
c) deep disagreements about how past actions should relate to future obligations 
and actions in a transition period; and 
d) growing recognition of the importance of, and challenges to providing, social 
and economic human rights.   
 
2.1. Unavoidable Interdependence and ‘Hurting Stalemates’ 
Peace processes generally are rarely the first choice of any party because they 
necessarily propose a compromise.  A key lesson has been that parties need a 
“hurting stalemate” in order to commit to the process7.  These “hurting stalemates” 
emerge from juxtapositions between conflict and unavoidable current and future 
interdependences.  
Due to continued emissions, increasing proportions of which are now coming from 
developing countries, adequate mitigation requires substantial action from a larger 
number of countries.  Simultaneously, climate impacts are being observed, and will 
only increase with continued inadequate mitigation 8  .  Climate change imposes 
interdependencies that extend beyond the borders of single societies and despite 
almost three decades of negotiations, equity debates remain largely unchanged.  
While a “hurting stalemate” is a value judgment, it appears that the climate context 
could qualify -and without major increases in mitigation this could deepen as impacts 
intensify. 
2.2. Inadequacy of Judicial Processes 
A challenge of the climate context is that the ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’ are not 
always easy to identify, may not be exclusive categories, and are indirectly connected. 
The mismatch between climate change and existing legal institutions has been 
demonstrated in the continued difficulties of using litigation 9 .  Currently judicial 
processes do not neatly fit the contours of the climate problem. 
Climate change is not unique in this regard.  For example, South Africa chose to use 
their Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) partially because the pursuit of 
justice for all victims individually would have overwhelmed the justice system, and 
because the link between specific victims and perpetrators was often difficult to prove 
in a legal sense10. Loosening the requirement of direct causation allowed the TRC to 
acknowledge victims of structural, generalized violence without having to identify 
                                               
7 I William Zartman, ‘The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments’, Global 
Review of Ethnopolitics, 1.1 (2001), 8–18. 
8 ‘IPCC Fifth Assessment Report: Working Group I: Summary for Policy Makers’, 2013. 
9 Richard Lord, Silke Goldberg and Lavanya Rajamani, Climate Change Liability: Transnational Law and 
Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
10 Paul Van Zyl, ‘Justice Without Punishment: Guaranteeing Human Rights in Transitional Societies’, in 
Looking Back, Reaching Forward, ed. by Charles Villa-Vicencio and Wilhelm Verwoerd (Cape Town, South 
Africa: University of Cape Town, 2000), pp. 42–57. 
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single perpetrators for particular crimes or demand that they compensate their 
victims individually11. This strategy had the dual advantages of acknowledging more 
victims than would have otherwise been possible, and of focusing attention on the 
structural shifts required to prevent further injustices.  The question this raises for 
climate change is, “what institutional arrangements would address historical injustice, 
and facilitate collective action in the context of legal limitations?” 
2.3. Disagreements about the ideal link between past and future 
action 
The UNFCCC explicitly calls for leadership from developed countries due to causal 
responsibility and capabilities. However, disagreements about the extent to which 
historical emissions should be used to delineate specific obligations are long-
standing.  In addition to debates about using past emissions to determine future-
oriented emission allocations, liability for climate impacts has been extremely 
contentious. 
A core component of transitional justice is navigating the elastic tension between 
past injustices and a future of coexistence.  Focusing too firmly on the past may 
prevent cooperative construction of a new future: for instance, perpetrators are 
unlikely to cooperate if they fear deep repercussions.  Focusing only on the future will 
leave injustices unaddressed which can undermine attempts to move forward: long-
term solidarity cannot be constructed if participants feel unacknowledged in the 
process of crafting a new regime. 
These oppositional pulls result in a dual set of requirements for a transitioning 
regime.  From the perspective of the ‘victims’, acceptance of an agreement is 
motivated by the desire for fundamental change, and must include substantial 
changes that will result in improved circumstances. From the perspective of 
‘perpetrators’, agreement may be motivated by the psychological and material costs 
of the continued tension, but they may also require some boundaries of retributive 
justice.  Specifically, for perpetrators liability for injustice may need to exist within 
some set boundaries and there may have to be a point at which responsibility ends12. 
Simultaneously, the new regime must offer genuine changes that offer victims 
acknowledgement and provisions for non-recurrence and structural change. The 
question in the climate context is what specifically is needed in order to satisfy both 
the need for historical justice and structural change, and to create conditions in which 
all can participate without fear of retribution.   
 
 
                                               
11 Richard Goldstone, ‘Foreward’, in Looking Back, Reaching Forward, ed. by Charles Villa-Vicencio and 
Wilhelm Verwoerd (Cape Tpwn: University of Cape Town, 2000), pp. viii – xiii. 
12  Peace versus Justice: Negotiating Forward- and Backward-Looking Outcomes, ed. by I. William 
Zartman and Viktor Aleksandrovich Kremeniuk (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005). 
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2.4. Challenge of addressing lost opportunities and deep loss 
A key challenge facing all transitional justice situations is that some injustices cannot 
be easily addressed including human rights abuses and the loss of life.  In the climate 
context there may be ambiguous losses from forgone opportunities (such as use of 
atmospheric space), in addition to human loss from severe climate impacts including 
loss of life, culture and, in some cases, all or some national territory. As in traditional 
transitional justice contexts, these losses can be both individual and collective; will 
have multi-generational effects; and can be economic and cultural in nature. 
Dealing with deep loss has been difficult for transitional justice, although several 
mechanisms including public acknowledgement, apologies, and various forms of 
reparations have been used.  Many of these mechanisms are designed to acknowledge 
injustices even if these efforts do not immediately change material circumstances.   
3. COMMON TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE PRACTICES 
Applying a transitional justice lens suggests several concrete practices which could be 
useful when trying to balance past and future oriented concerns in the climate 
context.  Several common practices which could be used as inspiration for efforts in 
the climate context include guarantees of non-recurrence; reparations; institutional 
changes; limited liability; and a formal peace building process. 
3.1. Guarantees of Non-Recurrence 
Guarantees of non-recurrence are key to transitional justice processes and can take 
multiple forms, including political and institutional reform, legal protections, and 
efforts to support cultural or social shifts such as educational programmes explaining 
past injustices. 
3.2. Reparations 
Reparations are common in transitional justice practice.  These vary and can be 
monetary or non-monetary. Monetary reparations are usually less than the ‘real’ cost 
of compensation, but are intended both as an expression of commitment to change 
and as a practical attempt to improve the lives of those most impacted by the 
injustice. Symbolic efforts, such as apologies, can be important but may also be 
perceived as empty (potentially intensifying conflict) if not accompanied by other 
substantive changes. 
3.3. Institutional Changes 
Either as a guarantee of non-recurrence or as a form of reparation, another relatively 
common feature of transitional justice arrangements (either as a formal part of the 
process, or as a result of the co-occurring social transition) are institutional 
investments such as support for social security or education or large-scale changes 
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such as constitutional shifts.  In some situations, such as in South Africa, these have 
attempted to include regulations intended to redistribute opportunities to those 
previously excluded. 
3.4. Limited Liability 
Many transitional justice processes include some form of limited liability such as 
partial pardons or incentives to cooperate by limiting legal prosecution.  Such 
processes have been controversial, but are often included as a means of gaining 
cooperation from those who would otherwise be too scared of retribution to support a 
transition and who are necessary to include due to their power in the system. 
Importantly, in many transitional justice arrangements limited liability has been 
combined with the threat of full liability.  For instance, cooperation in the South 
African TRC was partially encouraged by promises that those who provided 
information would not face full judicial action.  Similarly, not all those involved in 
human rights abuses are always fully prosecuted for international war crimes, but the 
possibility of this prosecution can be used to negotiate deeper cooperation.  To what 
extent limited liability is a meaningful tool in the climate context remains open for 
discussion. An alternative framing may be to pursue some boundaries on potential 
liability but this would also require further investigation. 
3.5. Formal Peace Process 
A transitional justice shift does not happen by accident but requires systematic 
efforts. Peacebuilding processes are unique to each situation, but often include 
opportunities to increase meaningful dialogue, guarantees of safety, third party 
support or mediation, clear rules of engagement, context specific rituals to facilitate 
social and emotional resolution of conflict, and explicit trust-building strategies and 
efforts to name a few.  While the specific strategies used in any given peace process 
may not easily transfer across contexts, the transferable component is the purposeful 
attention to the needs of the context and the desire to identify and implement a 
productive process.   
4. HOW MIGHT CLIMATE LEARN FROM TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE? 
Although climate change differs in important ways from traditional transitional justice 
contexts (see next section), there may be ways of using the common practices 
discussed above to inform international climate negotiations.  Some potential 
applications of these concepts could include the following: 
Mechanisms for Non-recurrence: It seems absolutely essential that a transitional 
justice approach would include very strong mechanisms for non-recurrence.  Although 
developed countries are already supposed to take leadership on mitigation, this 
obligation is emphasized in this approach, resulting in very strong mitigation 
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requirements for historically high emitters.  The challenge of guaranteeing non-
recurrence in the climate context is that current emissions trajectories – even with 
significant pledges for reductions – will lead to inevitable damage at this point.   Even 
if high historical emitters reduced dramatically, anthropogenic emissions would still 
create damages which makes it difficult to clearly identify who should be responsible 
for guaranteeing non-recurrence or what this would look like.  One starting point for 
using non-recurrence as a building block within a broader agreement would likely 
include deep domestic reductions for historically high emitters in addition to strong 
supports for rapid reductions in more recent emitting countries.  The goal would be to 
proactively shift to a low-carbon economy; and part of the commitment to non-
recurrence would be to support this shift as deeply and rapidly as possible.  While 
rapid decarbonization would help meet the call of non-recurrence, it would not 
entirely solve the problem due to the inevitability of damage from existing and ‘locked 
in’ emissions. 
Mechanisms to manage historical responsibility: There are at least two integral 
elements to managing historical responsibility.  The first includes some boundaries to 
liability. This could take the form of an agreed limit to emissions responsibility for 
historically high emitters when negotiating mitigation obligations.  However, in the 
face of loss and damage other strategies may be needed.  One option would be to 
develop supports for each developing country to conduct a loss and damage scoping 
study, allowing for increasing recognition of specific needs which could then be 
negotiated for support directly.  These loss and damage scoping studies would be a 
relatively minor extension of activities already supported by the  Warsaw International 
Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM), but would aim to identify specific needs as 
the basis for negotiations about support.  This would change the focus from undefined 
calls for finance to concrete actions which may help mediate fears of unlimited 
liability while also addressing the needs of the most vulnerable.  
A second potentially important element of managing historical responsibility would be 
formal acknowledgement of it, beyond that which is already enshrined in the UNFCCC.  
This could take multiple different forms including some type of an apology or formal 
recognition, or commitments to domestic education.  While such symbolic gestures 
alone are unlikely to be insufficient, they could play a role.  
Forward-Oriented Structural Change: Significant structural shifts to promote 
wellbeing for those who have been particularly impacted by climate change,  and to 
fundamentally support long-term mitigation action in all countries (including those 
facing significant development challenges) would be an essential element of a 
transitional approach.  A range of elements could include: debt relief within finance 
packages;  increased focus within core areas such as the technology support and 
capacity building to examine how to design these to enable deep, sustained change 
domestically that will support long-term mitigation while actively benefitting those 
who are least well off.  Some of these elements – specifically arguments for low 
carbon development and inclusive ‘green growth’ approaches may already be 
developing mechanisms for facilitating this. However, a transitional approach would 
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push the conversation further to ask how specific mechanisms – such as the 
technology mechanism or support for capacity building – are designed to result in 
fundamental improvements in wellbeing for those who face the most intense human 
development challenges in the face of climate change.  To the extent that loss and 
damage scoping studies were included as described above, this mandate could also 
include proactive measures wherever possible to build specific forms of capacity 
identified as potentially useful in specific contexts. 
Explicit Peace Process: To date there has been limited overlap between those with 
experience in peacebuilding and those working on the climate context.  In addition, 
the UNFCCC already has a suite of formalized rules and processes which are unlikely 
to be easily shifted.  Identifying which specific peacebuilding tools would be most 
helpful in the climate context is an open question but could include explicit trust-
building efforts; additional informal dialogues (including processes and open 
meetings outside the UNFCCC); or open discussions of transitional justice options.    
5. POTENTIAL LIMITATIONS AND PITFALLS 
Despite their similarities there are several limitations and pitfalls to consider when 
evaluating the utility of transitional justice as a source of lessons for the climate 
context.   
First, timing matters. Some aspects of historical injustice have already occurred, such 
as the consumption of finite atmospheric space by a global minority. However, others, 
such as losses from climate impacts, have only begun or may not have yet fully 
emerged although they are extremely likely due to past and continuing emissions. 
Does it make sense to use elements of transitional justice when the full scope of 
injustice is not yet apparent? If so, based on the argument that those who have and 
will suffer injustice should not have to wait for more to suffer, how could future 
injustices be factored into this framework? 
Second, most transitional justice processes happen within communities or a single 
country. The fundamental premise is that there is a social unit with sufficient 
investment in building or maintaining unity that all parties will be willing to cooperate.  
Is the international community a sufficiently strong ‘society’ that these processes 
make sense?  
Third, all transitional justice arrangements have a potential for co-optation and not all 
processes have resulted in benefits for those who are least well-off.  There remains a 
risk that powerful actors will be able to reap the benefits of peace processes without 
committing to  significant change. What would be needed to ensure genuine structural 
changes benefit those who are most vulnerable and who face the sharpest injustices 
in the climate context?  Simultaneously, there is a multi-scalar element to the climate 
problem. What mechanisms would be needed to ensure that national governments 
who received benefits from this process actually passed these on to those suffering 
greatest injustice within their borders? 
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Fourth, traditional justice processes are inherently messy, complicated and 
controversial.  They have rarely unanimously ‘resolved’ a conflict or resulted in a fully 
peaceful regime.  They are not a panacea, and are unique to each situation.  Does this 
model offer enough to be seen as useful in the climate context without creating false 
expectations? 
Despite these limitations, components of transitional justice approaches have been 
used in over 30 countries and continue to be developed.  The climate context may 
push the transitional justice framework to its boundaries, but ongoing and possibly 
increasing tensions between historical responsibility and the need for stronger 
collective action than ever before may warrant stepping back and assessing what 
lessons the climate community could reap from the depth of experience and 
theoretical development within this field  
6. SUMMARY AND NEXT STEPS 
Debates about historical justice run very deep, and failing to recognize them in the 
design of forward-oriented action could ultimately erode the potential for global 
cooperation in a regime with sufficient mitigation and an adequate response to 
climate impacts. While designed for a different kind of conflict, transitional justice 
may hold potential for providing a different lens and toolkit to the climate problem.  
To date efforts to manage issues of climate equity have not resulted in decreased 
tension about historical responsibility, and while new evidence that low-carbon 
development is both possible and can result in concrete benefits, it runs the risk of 
‘papering over’ rifts about historical responsibility that could, in the long run, 
diminish the extent and stability of change.   
This working paper is part of a larger project, “Evaluating peace and reconciliation to 
address historical responsibility within international climate negotiations” which aims 
to explore the potential for applying lessons for the climate context from transitional 
justice experiences. This working paper emerged out of the results from an initial 
scoping workshop and is a direct input to a second workshop designed to more 
substantively explore which lessons or tools from transitional justice could be used in 
the international climate context. 
A second workshop is being planned in order to more fully explore these ideas from 
theoretical, political and practical perspectives. Details for this workshop are still 
being formalized but we expect to hold it in early March 2016. Please do not hesitate 
to contact the Climate Strategies secretariat for more information or to express 
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